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ABSTRACT
Most cases of historical injustices that attract public attention are at least partly caused by
states. However, there is not yet a universally agreed upon, single version of a normative account
that addresses all associated problems. In this paper, I attempt to defend the State Endurance
Account as part of a response to the question of how we should account for reparations for statecaused historical injustices. This account supports the view that, in general, it is justified to
require a state to fulfill its duties incurred in the past, including reparatory duties.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Historical injustices are past wrongs, many of which have never been fully redressed.
Such injustices did not merely stay in the past but continue to toxically affect the original
victims’ descendants and social relations at large.1 Reparations for historical injustices have
become an important issue in both contemporary politics and political philosophy. However, this
topic is notorious for the various difficulties around it. On the one hand, it is not often clear upon
scrutiny to whom the reparations are owed and what is owed. On the other hand, it is also
difficult to demonstrate who should bear the costs as typically, no living person was alive when
the original injustice took place. Yet, states endure despite losses or gains of individual citizens.
Occasionally, a whole generation of citizens die out. However, we still take their state to
remain—identical to what it was before—and expect it to fulfill any duties it incurred previously.
Relying on these observations, various contemporary philosophers have proposed or at least
suggested what I call the State Endurance Account as part of an account of reparations for
historical injustices.2
Not all historical injustices were caused by states; nevertheless, most cases of historical
injustices that attract public attention are at least partly caused by states. Among these cases, it is
not unnatural to hold the perpetrator state responsible for compensating its victims even though
the injustice happened long ago, and none of the citizens who contributed to the original injustice
exist any longer. This proposal seems reasonable and circumvents various difficulties for
advocating reparations for historical injustices. That said, there is not yet a universally agreed
upon, single version of the State Endurance Account. Moreover, none of the existing works that

1

Alternatively, one may claim that the absence of full reparations continues to create new victims.
These philosophers include but are not limited to David Boonin (2011), Bernard Boxill (2003), David Miller
(2007), and Michael Ridge (2003).
2

2
endorse the State Endurance Account has fully considered the challenges one may raise about
this account. In this paper, I aim to provide a refined version of the State Endurance Account and
defend it against various objections. I do not present a complete theory of state reparations for
historical injustices, which may involve other issues that deserve clarification and defense.
However, the account I develop in this paper should strengthen such a theory as it maintains
states could be justifiably held responsible for their past deeds.
In the first section, I lay out the State Endurance Account and explain why this account is
attractive. I then discuss two issues on which I differ from the philosophers who propose other
versions of the State Endurance Account in the next section. In the third section, I defend the
State Endurance Account against two interrelated objections. I conclude that the State Endurance
Account does not violate the core tenets of liberalism and is justified.
2

THE STATE ENDURANCE ACCOUNT

In brief, the State Endurance Account of state duties claims: (1) a state may persist after its
citizens, who collectively contributed to a state act, pass away; (2) as an enduring agent of the
original act, this state ought to fulfill any duties associated with the original act, including
reparatory duties if the act was harmful. As I intend this account be a component of a complete
theory of reparations for historical injustices, I will place my discussion of this account in the
context of state reparations and examine some perhaps reparation-specific problems. However,
this account itself does no more than establish that states should be responsible for their past acts.
In this paper, I will ignore questions such as how we should determine the amount of monetary
compensation and how we establish the recipients’ claim to reparations.
One thing I should clarify at the beginning is that this account involves no odd ontological
commitments regarding the state. Read in an overly literal way, this account may seem to posit a

3
collectivist conception of the state, i.e., the state is an entity over and above and distinct from its
constituent members in a problematic way (for a recent critique, see Ludwig 2017: 171).
However, such readings are misguided.
We do not have to commit ourselves to any substantive doctrine of group agency to discuss
issues such as the state’s obligation to honor its duties in political and legal contexts. Instead, we
can (and often do) take state agency as a term that denotes a set of complex mechanisms, which
facilitate solutions to problems such as unaccounted for historical injustices. Doing so allows us
to remain agnostic about the more foundational questions. The crucial question is whether the
resultant solutions prove practically useful and morally justified. In the case of reparations for
state-caused historical injustices, my answer to this question is affirmative.
The primary problem for the State Endurance Account, then, is that it seems inevitable that
we rely on the current citizens of the perpetrator state for the funds to satisfy the state’s
obligations incurred in the past. The State Endurance Account seems convincing in the abstract
and will surely be welcome among the recipients of the reparation, for instance. However, the
state is not a freestanding entity that can fulfill a massive amount of reparations without its
citizens’ services and raising taxes, at least not typically.3 Consequently, current citizens of the
perpetrator state, who seem entirely innocent regarding the making of the original injustices, may
be required to share costs that result from some other’s fault and complain. Since the original
injustice has happened long ago, why should we not let bygones be bygones? After all, although

3

One may have in mind states with an enormous amount of valuable natural resources at its disposal. Those states
may not need to directly impose extra costs on the citizens to fulfill the reparations. However, selling those
resources to fulfill reparations may still reduce the benefits the state’s citizens may otherwise enjoy and result in
public discontent. Also, I remain agnostic to the question whether states should possess assets such as natural
resources at all in this paper.

4
we may sympathize with the victims, why should we require innocent individuals to bear the
costs for the reparations?
There are several matters related to this issue. First, facing such complaints, certain
philosophers resort to the doctrines of property rights and unjust enrichment, as they are
primarily concerned with cases where the perpetrators have unjustly—without any
compensation—appropriated the victims’ land, wealth and labor, and passed down these assets to
their descendants (Waldron 1992: 13-20; also see Perez 2012: 70-72). As the current citizens
benefit from the continuously appropriated resources, they have no ground from which to
complain.
I do not find this approach promising though I concede that evidence for unjust enrichment
may reinforce the claim that later generations should bear costs for remedying historical
injustices. After all, not all harms bring their perpetrators advantages. An unjust war waged but
lost may significantly cost the perpetrators and negatively impact the socio-economic conditions
for their civic descendants. The perpetrators are not exempt from obligation to remedy the harm
merely because they did not profit. It is their contributions to the harm the typical reason why
the perpetrators should bear reparatory duties.
One may argue that absent any direct contribution to the harm, unjust enrichment from the
past harm may be the only reason why we should impose remaining reparatory duties on the later
generations. In cases where such enrichment does not exist, according to this view, we should
leave behind the unfulfilled reparations (there may still be other egalitarian or international
humanitarian reasons to assist the victims, but such assistance would not be “reparations” in a
proper sense).4 I doubt if all proponents of the unjust enrichment argument are committed to

4

For a useful semantic clarification of the term “reparation,” see Perez 2011.
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such a conclusion. More importantly, one should notice that it is the states rather than the citizens
that are required to bear the reparatory duties in our picture. That the state bears the reparatory
duty does not require reference to unjust enrichment at all since the state was the agent of the
original harmful act and should bear the reparatory duties. Given that, current citizens are simply
obligated to the state and so must help it fulfill its duties required by justice. The question of
whether and how a citizen is bound to such tasks is a different matter.
In this paper, I assume that any citizens could be reasonably expected to participate in such
tasks if their state is legitimate.5 If the citizens fail to recognize the authority of the state and
disobey when the state’s orders contradict their interests, we will face a more urgent situation,
the account of which is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, I will shortly elaborate on
other reasons why current citizens should contribute to the fulfillment of their state’s reparatory
duties without relying primarily on their recognition of their state’s legitimacy. For the present
purposes, it is enough to conclude that it is unnecessary to introduce unjust enrichment to the
current discussion.
Second, as Thomas Jefferson famously put it, it may be wrong for one generation to pass
down extra, unfulfilled debts to later generations, at least without equal or more compensating
benefits (1789). In some cases, citizens of one generation may inadvertently incur state debts that
their generation cannot pay off by itself. Indeed, there are certain cases in which citizens of one
generation have foreseen the risk of incurring state debts way beyond their capabilities to pay
off. Also, there are cases in which the original generation have the capabilities but refuse to pay
off the debts, leaving them to their descendants irresponsibly. In these cases, one may claim that

5

I will come back to this issue in Section 2.2 a bit more.
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since the current citizens are wronged because the previous generations did not fulfill their roles
responsibly, the current citizens should not bear the costs for any resultant, unpaid debts.
In an ideal scenario, one may expect each generation not to incur debts they could not pay
off. However, what we now face is a non-ideal situation in which the previous generations have
already not fulfilled their duties. I agree that the current citizens may be wronged in some sense
if their ancestors had a choice to pay off the debts. However, that these citizens are wronged does
not change the fact that their state is responsible for remedying the historical injustices but
continuously fails to do so. In a broad sense, the current citizens of the perpetrator state do
become victims of some sort of those who contributed to the original injustice. Nevertheless, the
proper victims under our discussion become victims mainly because of the lasting effects of the
original injustice and perpetrator state’s non-payment. The current citizens of the perpetrator
state become victims because of the original generation’s failure to fulfill their duties to help the
state at that time to remedy the injustice. These are two separate relations and do not seem to
offset each other.
Lastly, I anticipate that most would agree that given the way our society is organized, any
generation’s subsistence and flourishing depend on a variety of conditions, including their claims
to various legacies they inherit from previous generations. Such claims may concern ownership
of material resources, financial assets, or territories. They may also concern, moreover, legacies
of other kinds, say, the legal system or international legal status. To continue to enjoy the
benefits obtained from the state’s signing various international treaties previously, for example,
the later generation must maintain the state or form a new state as the legitimate successor of the
one before.6 Such maintenance, however, is of a holistic nature. Having identified themselves in

6

I take the identity of the state (or of a people) over time as a matter of social and legal construction. It is not a brute
fact that one belongs to a state, but the result of the entire citizenry organizing their society in specific ways.

7
the same way as the previous generations, as a political unity, the new generations must also
commit themselves to the obligations this political unity undertook in the past. For
simultaneously identifying one’s state as the one before in one context and denying it in another
similar context would be inconsistent, not to mention any consequent ethical concerns.
But why must later citizens rely on the benefits associated with the continued existence of
the state? The continued existence of the state provides certain benefits that one could not reject
without incurring overwhelming costs, e.g., basic infrastructure. As some philosophers have
pointed out, the enjoyment of such benefits does not sufficiently justify imposing burdens on the
beneficiaries since the price for avoiding these benefits could be unreasonably high (e.g., Nozick
1974). However, the continued existence of the state also provides benefits such as privileges
acquired from previously-signed international treaties that one generation could collectively
decide to abandon. It is conceivable that the current citizens reject all such benefits and decide to
negotiate new treaties by themselves. If a people are resolved to forsake all such benefits, on
what ground should we bind them to the debts unfulfilled by the state?
The amount of compensation owed for a past war crime, for example, may be enormous.
Nevertheless, it is not likely that the gain from abolishing historical debts can offset the various
losses and inconveniences generated by forsaking all abandonable benefits one receives from
one’s state. In addition to the benefits that are not easily avoidable, a functioning state, regardless
of its type, quality of governance, or our evaluation of it, must provide public goods of some
kinds that are technically replaceable but practically useful to retain, e.g., investment in military
technology, plans for future infrastructure projects, regulations on industrial wastes. I find it

Therefore, it requires “maintenance.”
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implausible that a people would rationally prefer to forsake all these goods or could do so in a
short time, given their other priorities.7
Also, we should not ignore the fact that states are often debtors and debtees simultaneously.
Rejecting the burdens imposed by past debts may be profitable at one point, but it also grants
others excuses not to repay the debts to the people in similar contexts in the future.
Consequently, no one could be sure that the opportunistic inheritance serves a people’s interest
in the long run. Overall, it is reasonable to require later citizens to assist their state with its
unfulfilled debts. The perpetrator state’s citizens’ complaints seem misplaced.
3

REFINING THE STATE ENDURANCE ACCOUNT

Having sketched the basic idea of the State Endurance Account, there are two other matters I
shall address. These are the matters I find other advocates of this line of argument either
insufficiently deal with or mistakenly opine on.
3.1

The Problem of State Succession
First, I shall clarify what I mean by the endurance of the state.8

7

It is easily conceivable how current citizens reject a treaty their state signed long ago and forsake the associated
benefits. It may be less clear how they could reject the material resources their state owns. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to discuss the details. Conceivably, the international society may put those resources under the category of
ownerless goods after the previous owners’ expressed rejection and leave the resources to some international trustee.
Depending on what the current people have received, they may wish to re-negotiate the amount of the debt with the
victims on the ground that the goods they receive are not proportionate to the debt they are now expected to inherit.
This would be a different matter. Also, recognizing the indispensability of receiving benefits from the state does not
entail that the goods associated with the state counterbalance the harms caused by a malicious state or obligate the
citizens to feel grateful toward that state.
8
In their discussion of slavery in the United States, both Boonin (2011) and Boxill (2003) developed arguments that
share many similarities with mine. However, both philosophers worked on the hypothesis that the U.S. Government
has played a role in slavery and has a continued existence even now with no discussion of state succession. Notably,
Boxill’s argument involves two separable lines of thought: the one based on citizenship and the one on most current
white Americans’ relation to their ancestors, with the priority on the second. Although Boxill rejects it as “a basic
fact of social ontology that governments and nations exist for centuries” and instead places emphasis on the actual
history of heritage inheritance, the citizenship restriction he does not clearly defend indicates the indispensability of
the factor of citizenship, thus, of an enduring state (2003:70-78).
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One may fear that since the State Endurance Account relies on the continued existence of the
perpetrator state, citizens of the perpetrator state could easily avoid their collective responsibility
by employing various tactics. For instance, those citizens could argue that their current state is
distinct from the one before after they tactically change the constitution or conduct a post hoc
division of territory. Such excuses to avoid the costs for fulfilling the reparations seem quite
problematic.
I find this worry noteworthy but do not consider the State Endurance Account vulnerable to
it. Using Anna Stilz’s terms, we would generate “perverse incentives” for malicious states and
create a chaotic global order that no one wants to enter if states can abrogate their responsibility
in such a tactical manner (2011:197). Depending on the conditions, there should be (and already
exist) international institutional arrangements that prevent such attempts in order to ensure that
everyone is aware that she should live up to the consequences of her actions.9 In this context, all
we need is an institution that ensures any new state undertake relevant debts and responsibilities
if it wishes to claim ownership of its predecessor state’s territory, assets, or resources.
I cannot here offer a detailed theory of how to design, improve, and implement such an
institution, and I shall defer to international legal theorists. However, the basic reason we should
enact an institution of regulating state succession is clear, as stated above.
What we need now is a more expansive understanding of the endurance of the state. After
incidents such as regime change, a state may not endure in the full-fledged sense. However, the
debtorship of the perpetrator state should not perish with the original perpetrator state but be
undertaken by a successor state specified by international law. The people under the governance
of the successor state should still help this new state fulfill its reparatory duties.

9

Here I have in mind the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties.
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3.2

Nation versus State
Second, some may be concerned about why my account focuses on states rather than nations.

For instance, although David Miller endorses much of the argument I present in this paper, he
maintains that we should switch the focus from state to nation, i.e., “a body of people who share
a common national identity, involving cultural values, attachment to a territory, and so forth, and
who aspire to institutions of political self-determination which they may or may not actually
enjoy” (2007:151-159).10 In this sub-section, I aim to show why this proposed shift of focus is
problematic.
First, I shall clarify my understanding of the two terms “state” and “nation.” It would be
beyond the scope of this paper for me to introduce a substantive theory or fine-grained
definitions of these two notions. However, I take it to be a plausible, vital distinction between
state and nation that only the state is an institutionally identifiable entity. If state officials
perform acts under qualified conditions, we will identify those acts as the state’s acts. If those
acts result in a harm, the associated responsibility is also attributable to the state. In contrast,
nations do not generally have such institutionally identified delegates.11 It is unclear, ordinarily,
whose acts could be appropriately attributed to an entire nation so that all nationals bear the
responsibility. Therefore, I take “collective harms caused by nations” as a figure of speech for
collective harms caused by a group of co-nationals, but not the nation per se.

One of Miller’s major challenges unmentioned in this section is about the feasibility of demonstrating “the
identity of states over time” (2007:141). For my reply, see Section 2.1.
11
There are figures such as Gandhi and Aung San Suu Kyi, who were, at some moment, accepted as the leaders of
the entire nation. However, I doubt if the extensive support and the identification with these figures justify
attributing their acts to all nationals, not to mention these figures are atypical.
In addition, states and nations do coincide from time to time. However, when certain individuals perform an act, it
would be important to distinguish the different capacities in which they perform the act. Even if a nation-state has a
clearly identified official, her act performed officially is only attributable to the state. For nations, both commonly
understood and defined by Miller, do not have the relevant institutional structure that makes the attribution of acts
feasible.
10
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Miller’s main reservation about the state-centric approach is that “many historic injustices
are not in fact perpetrated by states, but by peoples, or by individuals acting in the name of
peoples,” and the state-centric approach could not account for these cases (2007:140). Although I
share Miller’s concern with historical injustices caused by “peoples,” I doubt whether even
among contemporaries, some group could transfer their reparatory duties to others solely in
virtue of the two parties’ sharing the same nationhood.
The problem lies in the differences between the bond between the state and its citizens on the
one hand, and the bond among co-nationals on the other. The State Endurance Account requires
that a state perform the relevant harm in the first place. Although a citizen may not be personally
related to the harmful act (via profit or endorsement), we typically interpret her situation as she
stands in a unique, obligation-generating relation to her state, given her recognition of the
legitimacy of the state. The relation between the citizen and her state may obligate her to assist
the state with its debts. That said, the nature of such a bond between a citizen and her state has
undergone severe scrutiny from contemporary philosophers (e.g., Simmons 1981). In addition,
such a bond is not unlimited. Most liberal thinkers maintain that one is not supposed to obey the
state if the state’s demands violate basic principles of justice or threaten the subject’s security.
Fortunately, however, we do not have to define the bond in absolute terms or be concerned with
its normative source. Citizens may have different conceptions of the source and nature of such
bonds by their own standards but typically still agree they are bound.12
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One may object that reparations are different from other debts, such as public loans for infrastructure projects, and
the difference matters normatively. One may claim that infrastructure projects typically place most citizens as the
intended beneficiaries, and this obligates the citizens to pay off the debts. On the contrary, reparations bring the
citizens of the perpetrator state no benefits but only burdens. I doubt if this claim stands scrutiny since many
infrastructure projects do not bring most current citizens direct benefits. The constructions may take generations so
that the citizens and their direct descendants are unlikely to benefit from these projects. Alternatively, the benefits,
both direct and indirect, of some constructions may only be accessible to some minority groups but not to the
majority. I am skeptical whether my opponent would agree that citizens are not obligated with such projects if they
prove not directly beneficial to those citizens. Moreover, as I would show momentarily, helping one’s state with its
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That said, the bond between the state and its citizens does not seem to exist between me and
my co-nationals if our major connection is a shared national cultural heritage. If a group of
zealous nationalists initiates terrorist attacks in the name of our nation, am I thus obligated to pay
for their damage? It does not seem so—for the same reason parents are not commonly held liable
for the crimes committed by their grown children. We may blame parents for their failure to
nurture and educate their kids properly. However, we do not hold people accountable for crimes
that result from other adults’ free exercise of their agency even if the two parties share the
strongest social ties—that is, family ties.
One may object that perhaps beyond personal contributions to the harm or unjust enrichment,
there is another source of one’s responsibility to make up for the national harm. For instance,
Linda Radzik proposed an account of duties to respond (2011). According to Radzik, victims of
collective atrocities may experience reasonable fear that the perpetrator group might not have
fully repented and may harm them again. Such fear is harmful to the victims and detrimental to
the community. To the extent this fear remains reasonable, as Radzik outlines a few limits, the
perpetrator nation’s members share a moral duty to respond to that fear, whose fulfilment include
“[a]pologizing, expressing regret and shame, offering help, and actively condemning” the
perpetrators (2001:466-468). Those members share such a duty mainly because “they are likely
to be the only ones who are in a position to mend it” (Radzik 2001:467). I concede that such fear
constitutes a legitimate concern and we must amend the broken relation between the victim
group and the perpetrator group. However, the duty to respond seems to only require the dutybearer to do something to help remove the fear.13 Public apology, recognition of the past,

unfulfilled reparations brings the citizens some crucial, though not obvious, benefits in the long run.
13
Using a Kantian taxonomy, one may say that the duty to respond is an instance of imperfect duty, which lacks a
rigid stipulation of what to do to satisfy the duty

13
instituting a more egalitarian international order, and publicly expressing commitment not to
harm in the future—all these are possible acts that would satisfy the duty as admitted by Radzik.
It is not clear, however, why material compensation itself is required to achieve the relevant end.
According to the account I am developing in this paper, requiring material compensations from
the historical perpetrator states would create global incentives for states to maintain a more just
international order. However, if the reason for imposing duties to respond is our concern about
the victim group’s fear, then the cure for that fear may take multiple forms and does not
necessarily include reparations we are now interested in.
To continue to advocate for the nation-centric approach, figuratively, one may speak of
nations failing to nurture and educate their members. Nonetheless, I or any other members of the
nation, are different from the nation per se: neither of us typically has authority over our zealous
co-nationals as parents do over their kids. Consequently, it is dubious that we should be
accountable for such educational failures.14 Perhaps my refusal to criticize co-nationals of mine
would be thought to constitute a tacit endorsement of their acts and leave me liable for those acts
in some weak sense. This could be the reason why an announcement of distancing one’s nation
from a group of fanatics is due on some occasions. Admittedly, there are also cases in which
distancing oneself from the fanatics is only counterproductive as outsiders may not know the
genuine mentalities of the distancers and worry about the distancers’ being secretive supporters
of the fanatics. In such cases, some more active actions, such as “[e]xpressing horror and shame
at the crimes,” may be expected. For these actions “will communicate sympathy with the victims

14

One may argue that just as parents with grown-up children, any individual citizen could not exercise enough
control over the state’s acts to make herself liable for those acts. Regarding this criticism, I shall admit that I could
not settle the controversy whether a lack of control over the state’s acts would undermine one’s political obligation.
However, a citizen’s inability to control the outcome of an election by a single vote and my inability to control what
my co-nationals/grown-up kids do seem to be respectively de facto and de jure lack of power, thus categorically
different.

14
and a wish to heal the rift” (Radzik 2001:468). Apart from this, the bond between me and my conationals, i.e., a “common national identity,” does not seem adequate to justify imposing
reparatory duties on other, non-participating nationals (Miller 2007:140, 151).
In some situations, I and my co-nationals may acquire some perhaps unwarranted advantages
and privileges through our national membership. Some may argue that the possession of such
advantages makes us liable for the reparations. To the extent that these advantages result from
historical injustices and constitute a counterpart to the victims’ losses, it is natural to claim that
the privileged must compensate the victims proportionally. I take this to be a variant of the unjust
enrichment argument and find it reasonable. There are also cases in which the specific
advantages do not seem to originate in injustices to the victims under discussion. In such cases,
since the connection between the advantages and the injustice hardly exists, it again seems
arbitrary to assign reparatory duties to those who merely acquire some advantages. Imagine I
have an uncle who later proves to be a fraudster. By being such a member the family, a nephew
of my uncle, I received much love and care. I may also have become the exact, happy person I
am now because of my uncle’s humor and the laughter he brought the family. Suppose, however,
my uncle was a stingy person to the extent that he did never spend a single penny on the family
and passed away. Should I financially compensate the victims of my uncle’s as I have benefitted
from being his nephew? It does not appear so unless, say, my uncle has unwittingly left us his
wealth. Still, as long as I return that wealth to my late uncle’s victims, it is not a common
expectation, if sensical at all, that I should use my own savings to make up for the remaining
debt. In conclusion, acquiring benefits through national membership one way or another does
not seem sufficient to burden the recipients with reparatory duties unless those benefits originate
in the relevant injustices under discussion.Overall, I find it unconvincing that the line of thought
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underlying the State Endurance Account applies to nations. It is not to say that none should be
held responsible for remedying historical harms caused by “peoples,” but we will need another
account for those problems.
4

THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE STATE ENDURANCE ACCOUNT WITH
LIBERALISM

In my previous defense of the State Endurance Account, I have appealed to considerations
such as the detrimental impact on international order of allowing the historical debts to be
superseded, and the perpetrator state’s interest were it to become a victim in the future.15 Some
critics may find my account too consequentialist in nature and argue that it violates certain core
tenets of liberalism.
In this section, I deal with some objections Nahshon Perez has raised against accounts such
as the State Endurance Account. Perez has made the most comprehensive examination of
consequentialist-oriented arguments for intergenerational redress, and I will primarily examine
two of his principal objections to this orientation (2003).
4.1

Is the State Endurance Account Against “Separateness between Persons?”
Perez bases his fundamental criticism of various arguments for historical redress on the

Rawlsian liberal doctrine of “separateness between persons:” “imposing costs on person X,
following a wrong committed by person Z, is illegitimate” (Perez 2007:16). According to Perez,
talk of essentially collective responsibility may unwarrantedly violate this core tenet of
individualism and liberalism. Nevertheless, at least when it comes to the State Endurance
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Section 2.1 and Section 1.
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Account, it appears that this criticism results from an error in the way one frames the basic
question.16
Rather than imposing one’s responsibility on another simpliciter, according to the State
Endurance Account, present and future generations are not required to repair the harm as if mere
strangers caused the harm. Nor are the later generations required to make reparations merely
because their ancestors caused the harm. Nor again are they required to pay for the crimes of
persons with whom they happen to share common citizenship but have no further connection,
e.g., the zealous nationalists discussed earlier. On the contrary, these later generations are
required to help their state repair the harm the state once committed. The state with which a
person is affiliated is an entity distinct from this person. However, this does not mean the state is
as alien as some strangers whom the person could reasonably identify as mere “others.”
But how could a state simultaneously be distinct from but also not alien to a citizen? To
explicate this seemingly paradoxical claim, I suggest we approach the state mainly in terms of its
institutional functions as a complex cross-generational collective cooperative scheme with no
mention of its ontological structure.17 From this perspective, the state is an institution that
coordinates massive transactions of various kinds among individuals, and, makes possible
cooperative projects that last generations. Individual citizens engage with this institution,

The doctrine of the “separateness between persons” is a complicated issue, and there may be more nuanced
formulations of the doctrine. However, in this section, I mainly deal with Perez’s version as a part of his criticism of
reparations for historical harms. My argument here should be compatible with various anti-consequentialist stances.
For more discussion, see Brink 1993.
Also, elsewhere, Michael Blake defended the view that liberalism is compatible with assigning certain burdens
particularly to citizens in virtue of the citizens’ sharing a legal system (2001). His argument does not directly imply
that it is reasonable to assign the burdens I discuss in this paper to ordinary citizens. However, it shows that states
may possess a salient normative standing within the framework of liberalism, and states may justifiably exercise
coercion on its citizens they may not otherwise exercise on non-citizens.
17
This conception of the state is inspired by Rawls (1999:4). We do not need, as we’ve already seen, to involve
controversial social ontological commitments such as a collectivist conception of the state, i.e., the state is an entity
over and above its constituent members.
16
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participate in it, and receive benefits in return because of their undertaking costs they would not
otherwise bear. In the current case, while present citizens undertake the burden of paying for
their ancestors’ unfulfilled responsibilities, they also receive other legacies from their ancestors
and the benefit from undertaking those responsibilities, e.g., the creation and consolidation of a
more desirable international order where no country could avoid its responsibility for reparations
by tactically postponing its fulfillment. The costs these citizens bear are not the consequence of a
unilateral, arbitrary imposition but a part of a large set of transactions that bring citizens
advantages.
Furthermore, I do not find the distribution of collective responsibility objectionable even if
the responsibility undertaken happens not to bring the citizens the intended advantages. The
sacrifice made by individuals may not always be compensated by reciprocal benefit: citizens of a
once-perpetrator state may pay to fulfill its reparatory duties despite hardships but do not receive
equal treatment when another state owes debts to them. This does not suggest that we should not
aspire to an international order in which each party behaves more responsibly or try to realize
this ideal. Nor are the efforts to fulfill one’s responsibilities necessarily in vain; if they are, at
least in this particular case, I propose that we improve the various unfavorable conditions rather
than forsake the ideal.
In conclusion, the State Endurance Account articulates an ideal of international order
accompanied by a conception of the state that I anticipate Rawlsians would endorse. It does not
violate the doctrine of “separateness between persons” as Perez thinks.
4.2

Are We Treating Later Generations as Mere Means?
One may also characterize our endorsing historical redress for the sake of creating an ideal

international order as essentially a strategy to deter present and future states from causing harm.
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Regarding such strategies, Perez claims that we are imposing burdens on innocent persons “to
deter future perpetrators of a hypothetical wrong.” We thus treat the present generation as “a
means rather than an end in themselves,” which is against the core liberal doctrines (2007:108109).
With the explication from the last subsection, my response to this objection is simple.
According to the State Endurance Account, the bearers of the historical debt should rather seek
to determine the best rules for international society in the long run. The problem they face does
not only have the description of “leaving victims’ descendants the way they are or burdening
innocent citizens of the once-perpetrator state.” It also has the description “whether we should
create a global order in which malicious states have greater incentives to cause harm because all
debts would be nullified in one generation.” As I suppose most of us would prefer avoiding such
an order, those citizens are not a means to an end but rational agents who would endorse an
international rule that happens to leave them with debts for historical injustices on a particular
occasion.
Nonetheless, there is another sense in which the perpetrator state’s citizens may feel burdens
are arbitrarily imposed on them. Consider the case in which victorious states unilaterally impose
reparatory duties on defeated countries as a result of the defeated countries’ waging unjust wars.
Non-ideal procedures for ascertaining the debts as such may still deprive the defeated states’
citizens of the feeling of co-authorship in making related international rules, though, in principle,
these states should pay for the reparations. Consequently, these citizens may fail to recognize
these rules as fair ones, though not because they would not otherwise endorse these rules per se.
Instead, these citizens may feel so because they are not content with the procedures of applying
the rules.
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These problems may have motivated Perez’s following claim that since the citizens may be
outraged by being treated as mere means to deter other states from causing potential harm, their
discontent may transform into destructive public mistrust of the legal system (Perez 2007:109). I
acknowledge such “discontent,” but disagree with Perez regarding the diagnosis. Though I admit
people may have such feelings of being used as mere means, I believe it is the imperfect,
sometimes unjust, procedures of specifying and applying relevant rules rather than the rule itself
that causes the trouble. Problems of this kind put on us a requirement of creating just background
institutions and procedures in actual politics but by no means challenge the normative force of
the State Endurance Account.
5

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have presented the State Endurance Account as part of a response to the
question of how we should account for reparations for state-caused historical injustices. This
account supports the view that, in general, it is justified to require a state to fulfill its duties
incurred in the past, including reparatory duties. In addition, incidents such as regime change
should not affect this normative requirement on succeeding states.
Against the critics, I argue that nations could not be the subject of the argument underlying
my account. I also argue that asking current citizens to pay taxes for reparations for historical
injustices should not be read as a simple matter of imposing one party’s responsibility on another
innocent party. Instead, the citizens are to assist their state with its duties in a way compatible
with the core tenets of individualism. Furthermore, that the state should continue to be
responsible for its historical acts is not a result of some arbitrary imposition. Instead, it results
from our establishing an international rule applicable to all states that the citizens of the
perpetrator state would also rationally endorse. Lastly, given just background institutions,
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citizens of the perpetrator state should also be able to feel they are the co-authors of the rule, not
mere means to the creation of an ideal international order.
That said, I conclude by noting that the State Endurance Account does not specify the details
of how we should implement the reparations. Nor does the account assert that we must complete
the reparations in one generation at whatever costs. Following Bernard Boxill, I agree that if the
immediate fulfillment of historical reparations would result in humanitarian crises within the
perpetrator state, we may need to postpone its full fulfillment provisionally (2003:78). Moreover,
I am suspicious of forcing perpetrator states to immediately fulfill the reparations at the risk of
severe economic recession. I am also suspicious of insisting on high interest rates for the
reparations so that the perpetrator state may be trapped in a vicious debt cycle. Both measures
would debilitate the perpetrator state and cause collateral damage to other victims of this state,
not to mention any injustice that happens to the perpetrator state’s citizens. Without much space
to investigate these issues in more detail, I shall leave these questions for future research.
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